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Abstract
Objective Our objectives were to explore the changes in
the level of interest in risk-sharing agreements (RSAs) in
the EU during the last 15 years and the underlying reasons
for these changes.
Methods A systematic literature review was conducted
using PubMed, Scopus, Web of Science, and Embase.
Articles identified were divided into ‘quantitative articles’
used to establish the level of interest and ‘qualitative arti-
cles’ used to identify the underlying trends in RSAs.
Results The literature search retrieved 2144 scientific arti-
cles. Data were extracted from 238 articles. Of these, 100
contained quantitative data and 138 contained qualitative
data. The pace of articles being published about RSAs grew
significantly in 2015, which related to the increase in interest
in and knowledge about RSAs. The underlying reasons for
the fluctuations were condensed into four overall themes: (1)
push for value-based pricing, (2) economic crisis and further
push to contain costs, (3) criticism of RSAs in the real
world, and (4) diversification of RSAs to fit the purpose.
Conclusion The overall level of interest in RSAs in the EU
has been increasing since 2000; therefore, articles reporting
the number of RSAs implemented and case studies have
been steadily growing as evidence is becoming more
readily available. The number of qualitative articles
reporting and discussing the underlying reasons for these
changes in interest has largely fluctuated over the last
15 years. Despite these fluctuations, interest in RSAs
remains high.
Key Points for Decision Makers
There is a high level of interest in risk-sharing
agreements between payers, regulatory agencies, and
companies.
Underlying reasons for changes in the level of
interest in risk-sharing agreements include (1) push
for value-based pricing, (2) economic crisis and
further push to contain costs, (3) criticism of RSAs in
the real world, and (4) diversification of RSAs to fit
the purpose.
Increased reporting on pricing and reimbursement
practices has led to an improved understanding of
risk-sharing agreements.
1 Introduction
According to ‘‘Health at a Glance: Europe 2014’’ [1], the
aging population and longer life expectancies will increase
the burden on healthcare systems in the coming years. In
addition, decreasing odds of success in clinical trials as
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well as new but expensive technologies have increased
drug prices. The increasing cost of healthcare is a major
problem for most countries in the EU as they have main-
tained near-universal healthcare coverage [1]. New and
innovative approaches to pricing and reimbursement are
needed if national healthcare payers are to be able to
provide patients with access to new, innovative, and
effective drugs while keeping within their limited budget
[1–4].
Consequently, pharmaceutical manufacturers are being
pressured to demonstrate real-world value for money
beyond that of the three traditional criteria of drug regu-
lators: quality, efficacy, and safety [5, 6]. Many countries
are employing health technology assessment (HTA) agen-
cies to evaluate on their behalf the real-world worth of new
medicinal products [6]. However, the data available on the
cost effectiveness of many new and innovative medicines,
particularly in oncology, are severely lacking at the time of
product launch [7]. This can create a significant level of
uncertainty around a product’s performance in the real
world, which in turn can cause delays in reimbursement
decisions by HTA agencies, resulting in potential revenue
loss by manufacturers [7]. Conversely, payers can poten-
tially risk reimbursing expensive medicines that have
questionable benefits, and this can direct resources away
from patients.
To address this issue, national healthcare payers, HTA
agencies, and the pharmaceutical industry found common
ground in the form of formal arrangements. The aim has
been to share the financial risks associated with new and
innovative medicines when the value of a product is not
fully observable at the time of its launch [7, 8]. These
agreements have many names and come in various forms,
but the one characteristic they all have in common is the
potential to enable patient access to new medicines that
otherwise would not be available at the time of product
launch [9]. The most common names for these formal
arrangements include risk-sharing agreements (RSAs),
payment by results (PbRs), patient access schemes (PAS),
or performance-based risk-sharing agreements (PBRSAs),
and the overarching concept is managed entry agreements
(MEAs) [7, 8, 10–13]. In this article, we use the term RSA
to describe all of the above as it is the most often used in
the literature [14]. Years of debate and lack of consensus
appear to have impeded the progress of RSAs; however,
today the term is accepted and well known in various
sectors of the healthcare system [15].
Over the last 15 years, several articles have reported an
increase in [12, 16–21] or discussed the implications of
RSAs [7, 22]. However, to the best of our knowledge, no
article has evaluated the number of articles about RSAs
alongside the implications of their use to discuss the overall
trends in RSA development. This article addresses this
issue through a systematic literature review with an aim to
(1) track interest and changes in RSAs in the EU over the
last 15 years and (2) analyse the ‘how’ (the processes), the
‘who’ (the stakeholders) and the ‘why’ (the circumstances)
that have contributed to these changes.
2 Methods
We conducted a systematic literature search and divided
selected articles into two groups: (1) quantitative articles to
explore changes in the level of interest and (2) qualitative
articles to explore the underlying reasons for the changes.
2.1 Literature Search
One author (TJP) performed an initial literature search to
compose a list of searchable keywords. Grey literature
from Google, Google Scholar, and the official websites of
international organizations such as the World Health
Organization (WHO), the International Society for Phar-
macoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR), and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) were used. The decision to focus on EU member
states stemmed from the OECD’s yearly evaluation of EU
member states and their healthcare spending rates and
because European health authorities have more leverage
than authorities in other countries to deny reimbursement
based on cost-effectiveness studies [1, 14, 15].
The list of keywords and relevant databases were iden-
tified in a three-step process. A number of keywords used
to define RSAs were identified through the above-men-
tioned initial literature review. Next, a list of databases was
created that only searched for peer-reviewed articles.
Keywords were then entered individually into each data-
base to validate the choice of keyword and database. With
all predefined filters set (see the ‘‘Appendix’’ for an
example), the number of ‘hits’ was taken into consideration
when selecting both the keywords and the databases. The
following keywords and terms were retained and used in
the search: patient access scheme, pharmaceutical risk
sharing, risk sharing, risk sharing scheme, risk sharing
agreement, managed entry agreement, payment by result,
performance based risk sharing agreement, coverage with
evidence development, and price volume agreement.
The following databases were searched for peer-re-
viewed literature: PubMed, Scopus, Web of Science, and
Embase for all years leading up to January 2016. No
publication date filter was used so older articles were not
overlooked. The search was limited to English-language
articles. Only agreements or schemes relating to pharma-
ceutical products were included; medical devices and
diagnostic tools were excluded because pharmaceuticals
110 T. J. Piatkiewicz et al.
require a higher level of evidence for reimbursement. The
inclusion criteria specified that the title of the article
included or alluded to at least one of the searched words
and was about or relevant to the objective. The article had
to be related to pharmaceutical products; be conducted or
published in and/or about EU member states; and/or
involve the sale of pharmaceutical products (i.e. reim-
bursement). The exclusion criteria included articles about
non-EU member states (e.g. USA, Australia, Asia, Israel,
and Africa), capitation (monetary allocation to doctors,
physicians, nurses, and hospitals), vaccines, medical devi-
ces, diagnostic tools, hospital financial schemes, and/or
pure financial schemes. Additional exclusion criteria
included Medicaid or Medicare (as these pertain to the US
health system), administrative work with and without
physicians, and/or needles and syringes. Abstract screening
was conducted by one author (TJP) using the same filtering
criteria as used in the title screening and involved a more
in-depth analysis of the article’s contents.
The same author categorized articles as either quanti-
tative or qualitative research using criteria based on Cres-
well’s [23] description of quantitative and qualitative
methods: (1) quantitative methods ‘‘involve the process of
collecting, analyzing, interpreting, and writing the results
of a study,’’ and (2) qualitative methods ‘‘are purposeful
sampling, collection of open-ended data, analysis of text or
pictures, representation of information in figures and
tables, and personal interpretation of the findings.’’ A
simplified explanation of the differences between these two
approaches is that quantitative articles collect and analyse
data in the form of numbers and qualitative articles collect
and analyse data in the form of words [24]. Some articles
were described as mixed method reviews as they incor-
porated both qualitative and quantitative research; these
articles were categorized as quantitative research.
2.2 Data Extraction and Qualitative Analysis
For each peer-reviewed article that passed both levels of
initial screening, two levels of data extraction were per-
formed by one author (TJP). First, the summary informa-
tion (i.e. authors, title, abstract, and article classification)
was extracted for all articles into an evidence table. Sec-
ond, key concepts, data (i.e. numerical values), and sum-
maries of findings presented for all articles were extracted,
forming the basis of the final evidence table. Information
extracted from quantitative articles focused on the number
and/or type of RSAs investigated or tracked and the
country and specific years in which the RSAs took place.
Information extracted from qualitative articles focused on
the reasons for a shift towards value-based healthcare
systems and the need to implement RSAs. Other key
concepts included recommendations on how, when, and
where RSAs were implemented, examples of both suc-
cessful and failed RSA attempts, and other possible debates
for or against their use. At this point, a synthesis, keeping
close to the original findings of each study, was created and
integrated into a whole, forming a draft summary.
The author TJP used a qualitative content analysis to
identify recurrent themes and concepts retrieved from the
draft summary. This process involved the use of inductive
category development where themes and concepts were
formed while summarizing and assessing the extracted
information. These categories were deduced step by step
within a feedback loop wherein the categories were
revised, eventually filtering out the main points of analysis
[24, 25]. Saturation was reached when the analysis of data
showed recurring themes and no new insights. The com-
bination of the report on healthcare expenditure rates from
the OECD [1] and the time-related themes identified in the
qualitative content analysis allowed for the possibility of a
historical interpretation of the political and economic
pressures that led to the increased interest in RSAs in the
EU.
3 Results
3.1 Trends in the Level of Interest in Risk-Sharing
Agreements (RSAs) Over Time
The systematic literature search retrieved 2144 scientific
articles; 641 remained after title screening, and 238
remained after abstract review. Of these 238 articles, 100
contained quantitative data and 138 contained qualitative
data (Fig. 1).
The number of articles found for each year in the sys-
tematic review was used to create Fig. 2, which illustrates
how publication rates varied by year. The 100 quantitative
articles were published at a steadily increasing rate
between 2008 and 2015, and the 138 qualitative articles
fluctuated in a succession of waves as of 2009, increasing
in 2015. This quantitative analysis helped identify an
increasing level of interest in RSAs in the last 15 years
(Fig. 2).
3.2 Trends in Underlying Reasons for Change
in Level of Interest Over Time
From the evidence table for all articles (see the Electronic
Supplementary Material for the complete table; examples
shown in Table 1), four overall time-related themes
emerged from the qualitative analysis: (1) push for value-
based pricing (VBP), (2) economic crisis and further push
to contain costs, (3) criticism of RSAs in the real world,
and (4) diversification of RSAs to fit the purpose.
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3.2.1 Push for Value-Based Pricing
Our results suggest increasing demands from national
healthcare payers in the early 2000s to have pharmaceuti-
cals priced according to the benefits they offered as a
means to help allocate limited resources more efficiently as
healthcare costs increased [26]. This approach, known as
VBP, should balance the price of a new drug with the true
value to patients [26]. As early as 2001, the idea of out-
comes-based guarantees was beginning to be considered a
viable alternative pricing and reimbursement strategy, and
not merely a theory [26]. The initial idea of outcomes-
based guarantees was a scheme whereby if a drug failed to
meet predefined expectations, then the pharmaceutical
company would have to refund the costs of the drug to the
health authorities [26]. In theory, it was assumed this
would encourage pharmaceutical companies to promote
proper utilization by physicians, thereby ensuring that
health authorities did not waste resources on treatments
that did not meet expectations in the real world [26]. We
found no peer-reviewed articles that provided empirical
evidence on RSAs between 2000 and 2003, possibly
because the discourses at the time were theoretical and
therefore lacking quantitative data.
At the same time, awareness of outcomes-based
schemes was growing as the UK National Institute for
Health and Care Excellence (NICE) approved beta inter-
feron for multiple sclerosis (MS) where the base cost for
the therapy ranged from £42,000 to £90,000 per quality-
adjusted life-year (QALY) gained [27, 28]. This approval
Fig. 1 Flowchart of systematic
literature search and data
extraction using PRISMA
(Preferred Reporting Items for
Systematic Reviews and Meta-
analyses). RSA risk-sharing
agreement, VBP value-based
pricing
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introduced one of the first novel RSAs in healthcare.
However, Sudlow and Counsell [29] raised doubt in their
article ‘‘Problems with UK government’s risk-sharing
schemes for assessing drugs for multiple sclerosis’’ as beta
interferon was approved without evidence of cost effec-
tiveness. This explains the spike in the number of quali-
tative articles around 2003 and 2004 (Fig. 2).
The number of published articles dropped from 2005 to
2006 (Fig. 2) as data on the UK beta interferon RSA for
MS were still lacking. The impact of the Italian Medicines
Agency (AIFA) in 2004 as the national authority respon-
sible for drug regulation in Italy is discussed further in the
following sections. In 2007 (Fig. 2) the number of quali-
tative articles spiked as results of the UK’s RSA were
anticipated. At that time, many articles were questioning
whether such schemes were actually necessary [30–32].
3.2.2 Economic Crisis and Further Push to Contain Costs
At the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008, RSAs and
HTAs were beginning to emerge in the UK. At this point,
the push for value-based healthcare and pricing had sub-
stantial backing as healthcare resources were significantly
limited and budgets were cut. HTA agencies throughout
Europe were tasked with measuring the cost effectiveness
of new medicinal products before national healthcare
payers would reimburse the product [6]. Pharmaceutical
companies were now required to not only prove quality,
efficacy, and safety but also to provide significant data on
the cost effectiveness and budget impact of their new
products, more commonly known as the ‘fourth hurdle’ [6].
The change of power from regulators to payers became
even more important in 2008.
One result of the economic crisis was that many coun-
tries quickly introduced a wide variety of cost-containment
strategies to help curb pharmaceutical spending [1]. These
cost-containment strategies were more reactive than
proactive responses to the crisis and aimed to reduce the
initial cost of new pharmaceuticals [1]. Cost containment
was attempted by introducing international reference
pricing (IRP), price cuts, compulsory rebates, the promo-
tion of generics, increased co-payments, a more centralized
public procurement system, and, lastly, a reduction in
coverage by excluding certain pharmaceuticals from
reimbursement [1]. In essence, the economic crisis of 2008
helped catalyse the implementation of VBP. One example
of this was the new Pharmaceutical Price Regulation
Scheme (PPRS) that was passed in the UK, which formally
Fig. 2 Trends in risk-sharing agreement peer-reviewed articles are
shown divided into the number of total (blue diamond), qualitative
(orange square), and quantitative (grey triangle) articles. Critical
events for price negotiation in Europe are labelled in grey boxes and
corresponding years are marked by orange arrows. The four overall
themes and their corresponding timeframes are shown under the
x axis in blue boxes. AIFA Italian Medicines Agency, AMNOG
Pharmaceuticals Market Reorganization Act, DE Germany, EMA
European Medicines Agency, NHS National Health Service, NICE
National Institute for Care and Excellence, HTA health technology
assessment, IT Italy, PAS patient access scheme, PBRSA perfor-
mance-based risk sharing, PPRS Pharmaceutical Price Regulation
Scheme, RSA risk-sharing agreement, UK United Kingdom, VBP
value-based pricing
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Table 1 Example summary of articles with key characteristics for inclusion in systematic review. Qualitative and quantitative articles are
presented to exemplify the categorization of articles retrieved from the systematic literature search presented in Fig. 1
References Key findings from abstracts
Example of qualitative articles
Claxton [30] The report by the OFT on the UK PPRS recommends the reform of the current scheme, which is a combination of
profit and price controls, to one where price is based on the health benefits offered by a pharmaceutical. On closer
examination, some of the more commonly expressed concerns about these proposals do not seem to be well founded.
In principle, the OFT’s recommendations may contribute to allocative and dynamic efficiency in the NHS. However,
some dangers exist, and the details of how it will be implemented are crucial. For example, VBP with an
inappropriate threshold for cost effectiveness, or an inappropriate pricing structure, could lead to technologies being
adopted at prices where their benefits, in terms of health outcome, do not offset the health displaced elsewhere in the
NHS, a situation in which the NHS is damaged rather than improved by innovation. A failure to account for
uncertainty and the value of evidence in negotiating prices and coverage could also undermine the evidence base for
future NHS practice. Whatever view is taken, the OFT report will inevitably shape the scope of future policy debates
about value, guidance, price, and innovation
Thornton [32] The OFT report into the PPRS called for reform of the scheme, replacing existing profit and price controls with a
system of VBP. The report argued that VBP would be much more effective than the current PPRS both at providing
value for money for the NHS and giving pharmaceutical companies the right incentives to invest in drugs in the
future. The report has sparked a widespread debate about drug pricing in the UK and has been controversial in some
quarters. However, some of the more negative responses are based on fundamental misconceptions about the OFT
recommendations. In particular, contrary to some claims, the recommended system would provide strong incentives
for incremental innovation and the right balance of rewards for first-in-class and follow-on products. Nor, as is
sometimes argued, would VBP have an adverse effect on investment in the UK. Certainly, real challenges lie ahead if
VBP is to be implemented. These concern the definition of value, particularly where patient benefits differ
significantly by subgroup or indication, and the level of resource required to implement VBP. The OFT report
contains proposals for addressing each of these areas. Perhaps the most difficult challenge is the political one:
securing acceptance for a reform package that would create winners and losers among pharmaceutical companies
according to their success in producing valuable drugs. Ultimately, however, only a scheme that does precisely this
can hope to meet the needs of patients, the NHS and innovative companies in the long run
Towse [31] The OFT report on the UK PPRS recommends that when the current 5-year PPRS expires in 2010 it be replaced with
VBP, which involves pre-launch centralized government price setting based on a cost-per-QALY threshold plus
periodic ex post reviews. I examine the validity of the OFTs criticisms of the existing PPRS, review its proposals and
propose an alternative way forward. I conclude that PPRS has performed well as a procurement bargain between
industry and the UK government. However, it does not incentivize efficient relative prices. That is not its job. I
identify a number of problems with the OFT proposals. I recommend that key elements of a reformed UK
pharmaceutical environment for 2010 should include an expanded role for HTA but with companies retaining
freedom to set prices at launch; HTA use targeted via a contingent value-of-information approach; a retained
backstop PPRS, perhaps moving to an RPI-X type control; the use of RSAs and non-linear pricing arrangements;
measures to ensure more effective therapeutic switching at local level; and measures to improve the take up of cost-
effective treatments
Ando et al. [73] The increasing use of risk-sharing in reimbursement decisions across major markets necessitates that key stakeholders
understand the role of this concept in shaping drug development and regulatory decision making. The objective of
this research was to examine global trends in RSAs since 1990 to provide a comprehensive understanding of the
current and future impact of this fast-evolving concept. Primary research was conducted through 50 in-depth
45-minute telephone interviews in native languages. Subjects were carefully selected and represented payers,
government agencies, and HTA organizations in nine markets (five in Europe; Australia, New Zealand, USA, and
Canada) to understand their assessment of the role RSAs have or have not played in their respective markets, and
whether they will do so in the future. This was complemented with secondary research of reimbursement decisions
around the world based on a newly created database of RSAs around the world. In some countries such as the UK and
Italy, for certain therapeutic areas such as oncology, these agreements almost act as a substitute for the normal
reimbursement process, but primary research indicates that this practice faces significant resistance at many layers.
Still, many other countries are seeking to understand the potential applicability of RSAs to their own market. Also,
RSAs are being examined for their potential in several other therapeutic areas. While population- and patient-level
agreements remain the most popular, we conclude that health outcomes-based arrangements are significantly on the
rise, with 27 having been identified through the study in the markets that were studied, the majority of which were
signed since 2007. Just over half were signed for oncology therapeutics. Outcomes-based agreements are becoming
an increasingly important consideration to include in pricing models across the traditional development pathway for
new molecules
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Table 1 continued
References Key findings from abstracts
Towse and Garrison
[22]
This article examines performance-based RSAs for pharmaceuticals from a theoretical economic perspective. We
position these agreements as a form of coverage with evidence development. New performance-based risk sharing
could produce a more efficient market equilibrium, achieved by adjustment of the price post-launch to reflect
outcomes combined with a new approach to the post-launch costs of evidence collection. For this to happen, the party
best able to manage or to bear specific risks must do so. Willingness to bear risk will depend not only on ability to
manage it but also on the degree of risk aversion. We identify three related frameworks that provide relevant insights:
value of information, real option theory and money-back guarantees. We identify four categories of risk sharing:
budget impact, price discounting, outcomes uncertainty and subgroup uncertainty. We conclude that a value-of-
information real option framework is likely to be the most helpful approach for understanding the costs and benefits
of risk sharing. A number of factors are likely to be crucial in determining whether performance-based agreements or
RSAs are efficient and likely to become more important in the future: (1) the cost and practicality of post-launch
evidence collection relative to pre-launch; (2) the feasibility of CED without a pre-agreed contract as to how the
evidence will be used to adjust price, revenues or use, in which uncertainty around the pay-off to additional research
will reduce the incentive for the manufacturer to collect the information; (3) the difficulty of writing and policing
RSAs; (4) the degree of risk aversion (and therefore opportunity to trade) on the part of payers and manufacturers;
and (5) the extent of transferability of data from one country setting to another to support CED in a risk-sharing
framework. There is no doubt that in principle risk sharing can provide manufacturers and payers additional real
options that increase overall efficiency. Given the lack of empirical evidence on the success of schemes already
agreed and on the issues we set out above, it is too early to tell whether the recent surge of interest in these
arrangements is likely to be a trend or only a fad
Example of quantitative articles
Carlson et al. [12] To identify and characterize publicly available cases and related trends for performance-based schemes, we performed
a systematic review of performance-based schemes over the past 15 years (1996–2011) using publicly available
databases and reports from colleagues and healthcare experts. These were categorized according to a previously
published taxonomy of scheme types and assessed in terms of the underlying product and market attributes for each
scheme. Macro-level trends were identified related to the timing of scheme adoption, countries involved, types of
schemes, and product and market factors. Our search yielded in excess of 110 schemes. From this set, we identified
58 schemes that included a CED component, 25 that included a conditional treatment continuation component, 35
that included a performance-linked reimbursement component, and 37 that included a patient-level financial
utilization component. Each type of scheme addresses fundamental uncertainties that exist when products enter the
market. There has been a continued upward trend in terms of total schemes adopted per year and the number of
countries with performance-based schemes in place. Despite the continued enthusiasm, challenges persist, including
those related to (1) the cost and burden of implementation; (2) the need for consistent processes for
scheme development, data collection, reporting, and evaluation; and (3) negotiating follow-on agreements after
scheme initiation. Furthermore, the challenges faced differ by country, health system, and product. There is continued
enthusiasm in many countries for using performance-based schemes for new medical products. Given the interest to
date and the potential to meet the goals of interested stakeholders, these schemes may become a common element in
healthcare coverage and reimbursement. However, significant challenges persist, and future studies are needed
regarding the attitudes and perceptions of various stakeholders as well as evaluating the results and experiences with
the schemes implemented thus far
Ethgen [74] Our objective was to define an operational modelling framework intended to help the design of PBRS schemes. A time-
to-event endpoint is used as a performance criterion. Such survival endpoints are commonly used in clinical studies,
notably in oncology where PBRS schemes are gaining momentum. The framework is based on an open population
model with a monthly cycle and 3-year time horizon from launch (i.e. when enrolment into the PBRS scheme starts).
Entry into the model (i.e. the progressive arrival of new patients into the PBRS scheme) is determined by market
diffusion assumptions and is modelled using a logistic function. Exit from the model (i.e. patients experiencing the
event or dying from any cause) is determined by survival curves from clinical/epidemiological studies and is
modelled using a Weibull function. The model accommodates different treatment dosing schedules and performance
levels (i.e. minimum survival times guaranteed). Multiple PBRS scenarios can be run and compared in terms of their
operational and financial implications. Additionally, the effect of potential revisions of a PBRS scheme terms and
conditions can also be examined as real-life information becomes available following scheme implementation (i.e.
Bayesian updating). For example, assuming 1000 patients enrolled in a PBRS scheme, with a monthly dosing
schedule and given diffusion (logistic alpha = 5.0; beta = 0.4) and survival (Weibull gamma = 0.7; k = 27.0)
assumptions, the model predicts that 1937 (6970), 4050 (7861), and 9282 (4420) doses will be given to non-
responding (responding) patients with 12, 18, and 24 months of minimum survival time guaranteed scenarios,
respectively. This framework provides both payer and manufacturer with valuable insight into the operational and
financial dimensions of the potential PBRS schemes they may contemplate as they negotiate patient access
conditions. Both parties can better anticipate the implications of the schemes and better plan resources, logistics, and
financial arrangements accordingly
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Table 1 continued
References Key findings from abstracts
Morel et al. [35] National payers across Europe have been increasingly looking into innovative reimbursement approaches, MEAs, to
balance the need to provide rapid access to potentially beneficial OMPs with the requirements to circumscribe
uncertainty, obtain best value for money, or ensure affordability. This study aimed to identify, describe, and classify
MEAs applied to OMPs by national payers and to analyse their practice in Europe. To identify and describe MEAs,
national HTAs and reimbursement decisions on OMPs across seven European countries were reviewed and their
main characteristics extracted. To fill data gaps and validate the accuracy of the extraction, collaboration was sought
from national payers. To classify MEAs, a bespoke taxonomy was implemented. Identified MEAs were analysed and
compared by focusing on five key themes, namely by describing the MEAs in relation to drug targets and therapeutic
classes, geographical spread, type of MEA applied, declared rationale for setting-up of MEAs, and evolution over
time. 42 MEAs for 26 OMPs, implemented between 2006 and 2012 and representing a variety of MEA designs, were
identified. Italy had the highest number of schemes (n = 15), followed by the Netherlands (n = 10), England and
Wales (n = 8), Sweden (n = 5), and Belgium (n = 4). No MEA was identified for France and Germany because
data were unavailable. Antineoplastic agents were the primary targets of MEAs. 55% of the identified MEAs were
performance-based RSAs; the other 45% were financial-based. Nine of these 26 OMPs were subject to MEAs in two
or three different countries, resulting in 24 MEAs. 60% of identified MEAs focused on conditions with a prevalence
of\1 per 10,000. This study confirmed that a variety of MEAs were increasingly used by European payers to manage
aspects of uncertainty associated with the introduction of OMPs in the healthcare system, and which may be of a
clinical, utilization, or budgetary nature. Whether differences in the use of MEAs reflect differences in how
‘uncertainty’ and ‘value’ are perceived across healthcare systems remains unclear
Ferrario and Kanavos
[75]
MEAs are a set of instruments used to reduce the impact of uncertainty and high prices when introducing new
medicines. This study develops a conceptual framework for these agreements and tests it by exploring variations in
their implementation in Belgium, England, the Netherlands, and Sweden and over time as well as their governance
structures. Using publicly available data from HTA agencies and survey data from the European Medicines
Information Network, a database of agreements implemented between 2003 and 2012 was developed. A review of
governance structures was also undertaken. In December 2012 there were 133 active MEAs for different medicine
indications across the four countries. These corresponded to 110 unique medicine indications. Over time, there has
been a steady growth in the number of agreements implemented, with the highest number in the Netherlands in 2012.
The number of new agreements introduced each year followed a different pattern. In Belgium and England it
increased over time, whereas it decreased in the Netherlands and fluctuated in Sweden. Only 18 (16%) of the unique
medicine–indication pairs identified were part of an agreement in two or more countries. England uses mainly
discounts and free doses to influence prices. The Netherlands and Sweden have focused more on addressing
uncertainties through CED and, Sweden has focussed on monitoring use and compliance with restrictions through
registries. Belgium uses a combination of the above. Despite similar reasons being cited for MEA implementation,
only in a minority of cases have countries implemented an agreement for the same medicine indication; when they
do, a different agreement type is often implemented. Differences in governance across countries partly explain such
variations. However, more research is needed to understand whether, for example, risk perception and/or notion of
what constitutes a high price differs between these countries
Tettamanti et al. [56] MAAs are vital to access the Italian market. MAAs, monitored by an AIFA registry, are divided into outcome-based
(cost-sharing) and non-outcome-based (risk-sharing and payment-by-results) agreements. The objective is to
understand the MAA adoption, evolution, and utilization variability among therapeutic areas. The desk-based
research was carried out by integrating different information sources, from AIFA and Gazzette Ufficiali to regional
HTA studies. Data were gathered for all the 82 products/indications belonging to an open registry signed up to a
MAA since January 2006 up until April 2015. 59% of products/indications have an outcome-based MAA, 33% a
non-outcome-based and 1% both. One-third of outcome-based and one-quarter of non-outcome-based MAAs have an
additional volume agreement or spending cap. A maximum peak of 30 products/indications with MAA was recorded
in 2014, compared with an annual average of 8. In 2006–2007, cost-sharing MAAs were predominantly adopted; in
2008–2011, outcome-based MAAs were negotiated in approximately half of the cases (57%), becoming, since 2012,
the preferred conditional reimbursement scheme (78%). Focusing on antineoplastic products, leukaemia drugs have
only non-outcome-based agreements; lymphoma, melanoma, breast, colorectal, and ovary cancer drugs have a
prevalence of outcome-based agreements, whereas renal cell and lung cancer drugs have both. Throughout the years,
there has been an increase in the adoption of MAAs as they are considered a valuable strategy to manage payer
budget impact and drug clinical benefit uncertainties. Since their introduction, the choice of MAA schemes utilized
has witnessed an evolution, with an increasing preference for outcome-based MAAs, though often applied together
with additional financial saving schemes. Due to the model adoption variability of MAAs within the therapeutic
areas, the study of their structure plays a key role in accessing the Italian market
AIFA Italian Medicines Agency, CED coverage with evidence development, HTA health technology assessment, MAA market access entry
agreements, MEA managed entry agreement, NHS National Health Service, OFT Office of Fair Trading, OMP orphan medicinal product, PBRS
performance-based risk-sharing, PPRS pharmaceutical price regulation scheme, QALY quality-adjusted life-year, RPI-X, RSA risk-sharing
agreement, VBP value-based pricing
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introduced PAS as part of its legal framework in 2009 and
was an important shift in the UK’s pricing and reim-
bursement framework [33]. The UK pushed its NHS to
consider the social value of medical treatments in an
attempt to solve the problem of inequity and to promote
innovation and a focus on underrepresented patient groups
[34]. Similarly, Germany approved the Pharmaceuticals
Market Reorganization Act (AMNOG) in 2011 whereby an
early benefit assessment became mandatory to obtain
reimbursement. This can be viewed as a formal move to
VBP [35]. The policy shifts in the pricing and reimburse-
ment practices of these two countries helped signal the end
of the era of free pricing in some of Europe’s largest
markets [36].
All these pressures on the healthcare budget forced
payers to discuss how to properly balance costly medica-
tions with the population’s needs while simultaneously
making coverage decisions while uncertain of the out-
comes [37]. Furthermore, the evaluation of cost effective-
ness with incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs)
and/or QALYs of all new drug applicants was a costly and
time-consuming task. As a remedy, national payers intro-
duced HTA agencies to act as an intermediary and make
recommendations on their behalf [30, 38].
HTA agencies became more important as authors such
as McCabe et al. [4], Lucas et al. [39], and Chawla et al.
[40] discussed how manufacturers increased their produc-
tion of drugs that surpassed the acceptable cost-effective-
ness measurements (e.g. cost per QALY or ICER) even
though the main reasoning behind rejection by NICE was a
drug with an ICER[£30,000 per QALY. Chawla et al. [40]
reported that HTA agencies usually have two options to
reach an agreement about a drug’s price and reimburse-
ment status: (1) to reduce the initial cost of the treatment
(financial discount) to meet the cost-effectiveness ratio and
(2) to enter into a PBRSA (outcomes-based) to overcome
any uncertainty the payer may have regarding the product’s
real-world performance. Although Chawla et al. [40] sug-
gested that RSAs do not guarantee a positive recommen-
dation by HTA agencies, other authors agreed that the
increase in the use of RSAs, especially for new oncology
therapies, appeared to indicate that reimbursement was still
very possible as long as both parties share the financial
risks while the company has time to demonstrate the value
of their drug [41–45].
3.2.3 Criticism of the Use of RSAs in the Real World
The shift to VBP came with its own set of problems.
According to McCabe et al. [4], payers were at risk of
jeopardizing their own healthcare system if medicines
deemed cost effective during product launch were in fact
not as cost effective in the real world. The authors raised
this concern because of a lack of standardization for cost-
effectiveness thresholds between and within different
healthcare systems [4]. The inappropriate use of predefined
thresholds such as ICERs or QALYs resulted in appraisals
that were not always transparent or robust [4, 30, 38, 46].
Cohen et al. [47] questioned the use of ICERs and/or
QALYs as reimbursement parameters because cost effec-
tiveness only evaluates overall gains in health. Conversely,
a budget-impact analysis with coverage with evidence
development (CED) takes into account the healthcare
budget as a whole; therefore, Cohen et al. [48] suggested
this was more important than a cost-effectiveness analysis
in reimbursement decision making.
As shown in Fig. 2, the sudden spike in qualitative
articles published in 2009 and 2010 was the result of
attempts by numerous authors to characterize and define
RSAs. For example, McCabe et al. [11] proposed a
framework for defining and evaluating risk-sharing
schemes. In addition, Carlson et al. [18] attempted to cat-
egorize and examine PBRSAs by performing a review
using public search databases. Their search yielded 14
performance-linked reimbursement schemes, ten condi-
tional treatment continuation schemes, and 34 CED
schemes; 36 of the 53 PBRSAs took place in the EU [18].
Confidence in the viability of PBRSAs was waning as
there were still not enough concrete examples of successful
schemes to fundamentally alter reimbursement policies
[15, 46]. In 2010, Towse and Garrison [22] and Towse [49]
acknowledged the lack of empirical evidence for successful
RSAs and tried to define RSAs based on previous defini-
tions. In 2011, the number of qualitative articles published
dropped substantially. For this period, the most that could
be said is that enthusiasm for the use of RSAs in many
countries continued [12], as the number of quantitative
articles being published grew steadily.
3.2.4 Diversification of RSAs to Fit the Purpose
As of 2013, there were 148 identified PBRSAs, with a
majority implemented between 2007 and 2011 [18]. As
shown in Fig. 3 [18], the rate at which new RSAs were
being implemented levelled out. Although the number of
drugs with RSAs attached to them plateaued in 2012–2013,
the majority of the new schemes were financial based,
demonstrating a shift away from PBRSAs to minimize
administrative burden [16–18].
According to Spoors et al. [17] and Pritchett et al. [50],
it was clear that difficulties with the implementation and
evaluation of PBRSAs, mostly in the UK, had shifted the
focus to the more simplified financial-based RSAs. As an
example of this, Briceno and Seoane-Vazquez [51]
reviewed 207 NICE drug appraisals between September
2001 and September 2014 and determined that more than
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45% of the appraisals published after 2010 included a
confidential discount from the company to the NHS. This
study highlighted that most high-cost drugs achieved a
positive evaluation from NICE only if a simple discount
was offered through a PAS [51, 52]. Although the UK
primarily preferred discounts, PBRSAs were also suc-
cessful. Sumra and Walters [53] reported on one such case
in their article ‘‘A long term analysis of the clinical and
cost effectiveness of glatiramer acetate from the UK mul-
tiple sclerosis risk sharing scheme.’’ This study involved
the creation of a model for the clinical and cost effec-
tiveness of glatiramer acetate (GA) using 6 years’ worth of
data from the UK Multiple Sclerosis Risk-Sharing
Scheme and a 20-year time horizon [53]. Based on their
model, the authors concluded that the long-term efficacy
and cost effectiveness of GA was greater than estimated
during the planning of the RSA [53]. Giovannoni et al. [54]
conducted a follow-up review and reported that this posi-
tive review allowed for the price to increase following the
agreed upon amount at the start of the RSA 6 years prior.
In light of successful PBRSAs such as this, Antonanzas
et al. [55] determined that financial-based RSAs were
preferred by payers when non-responding patients bore a
small impact on the overall health budget but—when the
cost was high—a PBRSA was preferred only if there was a
low monitoring burden.
In Italy, RSAs became a standard procedure to access
the Italian Market, and a recent study by Tettamanti et al.
[56], the AIFA, and local resources assessed 82 therapies
from 2006 to 2015. More than half of the therapies (59%)
had a PBRSA, 33% were financial-based, and 1% used
both schemes [56]. According to the data, PBRSAs slowly
replaced financial-based RSAs over the years and consti-
tuted 78% of the total schemes [56]. The authors concluded
that one reason for the change to PBRSAs was that the
AIFA relied heavily on their extensive online patient-
monitoring registries [50]. The AIFA monitoring registries
allow for the continuous evaluation of pharmaceuticals in
clinical practice and may in fact allow for quicker access to
medicines and promotion of innovation at affordable prices
[57]. Fasci et al. [58] presented an example of this in their
article ‘‘Conditional Agreements for Innovative Therapies
in Italy: The Case of Pirfenidone’’ when an RSA was put in
place for pirfenidone in the treatment of idiopathic pul-
monary fibrosis to gain reimbursement in 2013. By the time
of price renegotiation, new data from phase III clinical
trials and clinical practice were used to support the cost–
benefit profile of pirfenidone [58]. According to this article,
the evidence allowed the AIFA to overcome their previous
uncertainties about the benefits of the drug and to remove
the RSA while still covering the reimbursement costs [58].
Eastern Europe has also seen an increase in the number
of published articles pertaining to their experiences with
RSAs. Similar to the UK’s position on the adequate use of
RSAs, a systematic literature review and expert analysis by
Kolasa et al. [59] determined that PBRSAs were better
suited for real-world application when dealing with
uncertainties surrounding cost effectiveness, and financial-
Fig. 3 Number of performance-based arrangements by year. Hybrid
arrangements included the following: PLR|CTC: 2; PLR|FU: 1;
PLR|CTC|FU: 12; CED|PLR: 2; CED|PLR|FU: 1. CED coverage with
evidence development, CTC conditional treatment continuation, FU
financial/utilization, PLR performance-linked reimbursement Fig-
ure obtained from Carlson et al. [18]
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based RSAs were deemed more appropriate for budgeting
and cost containment. Since cost-effectiveness and budget-
impact analyses have become a requirement in most
healthcare systems for setting the reimbursement of highly
innovative drugs, Zizalova et al. [60] in the Czech Republic
recently evaluated whether or not these costs matched
those in the real world. They concluded that estimated
costs were exceeded by 31–332% in five cases [60]. In six
other cases, real costs did not achieve the estimations,
running from 12 to 91% under the estimated costs. This
study concluded that cost estimations for highly innovative
drugs, although required in budget-impact analysis, did not
contribute to a reasonable decision and had no real prac-
tical impact [60]. In Hungary, an analysis on the cost of
treatment with new antiviral therapies for hepatitis C virus
(HCV) by Kocsis et al. [61] was submitted to the HTA
agency, which found that the introduction of these new
drugs placed a financial strain on payers. As such, RSAs
appear to be a promising solution for balancing payer
uncertainty with the market access for new medicines in
Eastern Europe [61, 62].
As many healthcare systems faced budget constraints
and pressures by the year 2015, difficulties in making
choices about what treatments to fund remained. According
to Focsa [63], there is a willingness to pay a fair price for
new drugs and the benefits they potentially can offer, but
many current healthcare systems do not have the necessary
infrastructure and evaluation processes. Patient monitoring
has the potential to pave the way for accurate RSAs that
directly link patient benefits with the cost of the treatment
[63]. Dranitsaris et al. [64] concluded that VBP and RSAs
could allow for earlier access to new treatments, improved
transparency in pricing, the inclusion of multiple stake-
holders, the recognition of highly innovative therapies, and
a more predictable return on investments for
manufacturers.
4 Discussion
To address the uncertainty surrounding RSAs, our study
identified four time-related themes that explain the under-
lying reasons for the fluctuating levels of interest in RSAs
over the past 15 years.
The growing interest in the use of RSAs among phar-
maceutical companies and healthcare institutions in the EU
over the past 15 years has emphasized the knowledge gap
in the literature between what is publicly known and what
is actually practiced, partially due to a lack of transparency
from both parties [7, 22]. As a result, empirical evidence
and validated success stories have been lacking in past
years, and this has led to substantial debates about the
sustainability of alternative pricing and reimbursement
processes [7, 22]. However, details of and results from
RSAs that were originally not publically available are now
beginning to emerge [52, 65], enabling this study.
This study shows that, in the early 2000s, predominantly
qualitative articles were being published because evidence
for the number of RSAs implemented was essentially non-
existent as no RSA scheme had been introduced at the
time. Our study identified that initially, in 2000, only a few
authors and healthcare institutions were discussing the use
of RSAs in the EU, although a lack of articles published in
this time span could have been the result of delays in the
publication process. Nonetheless, it was evident that the
increased need for alternative pricing and reimbursement
strategies for market access has led to a significant increase
in interest in RSAs. However, with this increased level of
interest, our study has identified valid arguments and
questions surrounding their use by both advocates and
opponents of RSAs.
Our study shows that, after the economic crisis in
2007–2008, both the discussion and the implementation of
RSAs increased significantly. As a result, the number of
RSAs increased as more evidence was collected and pre-
sented as quantitative articles. In addition, fluctuations
were seen in the number of qualitative articles published as
the viability, budget impact, and sustainability of RSAs
was discussed and debated. In the following years, a sub-
stantial number of both qualitative and quantitative peer-
reviewed articles were published, providing invaluable data
and information about how many RSAs were being put in
place and the results of some older schemes. These articles
also reaffirmed the issues being dealt with by national
healthcare payers as pharmaceutical expenditure continued
to increase significantly across many OECD countries [66].
Several articles have concluded there is no ‘one size fits all’
or perfect method of risk sharing, and it should only be
used when the standard conditions of access are hindered
by uncertainty about cost effectiveness [2, 5, 46]. Addi-
tional studies have shown that special considerations must
be made as to the appropriateness of an RSA, its objectives,
and whether or not staff and IT systems are available to
support the administrative burden [2, 5, 46].
We identified several countries that have largely influ-
enced policies surrounding RSA use. These include the
UK, Italy, France, Germany, and—more recently—Eastern
Europe. We would like to note that the UK has played a
very important role as it was one of the first countries to
implement an RSA and has maintained very detailed
records. In addition, RSAs have been implemented in many
countries in the EU in accordance with each countries’ own
evaluation, governance, reporting, and evidence-collection
practices [50]. As such, many countries have had different
results and outcomes when implementing RSAs, and
manufacturers must consider each country and their
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implementation processes as key indicators when deciding
on the use of RSAs [50]. However, differences in HTA
assessment criteria have led to a noticeable difference in
drug benefit evaluations, recommendations, and overall
access to several EU markets for each drug [67].
Although RSAs continue to emerge in many EU coun-
tries, Neumann et al. [14], Carlson et al. [15, 68], and
Towse and Garrison [15] have discussed and identified
some of the most notable barriers to their implementation
as being (1) transaction and administrative costs; (2) lim-
itations to online tracking systems; (3) identifying and
agreeing on scheme details such as clinical endpoints, and
price negotiations, etc.; (4) IRP; and (5) the lack of trust
between payers, manufacturers, and healthcare providers.
Crinson [69] researched a combination of these barriers
in one of the first case studies on the results of an RSA
conducted in 2004 and proposed that the NHS was
unsuccessful in its attempt to control the cost of beta
interferon. Suggested reasons for this were the clinical
needs of the patients, the prescribing activities of the
doctors, and even the pharmaceutical company’s reluctance
to lower its profit margin [69]. By March 2003, fewer
patients than planned had entered the RSA scheme and not
the thousands needed before November 2004 [70]. Many of
the initial problems were delays in setting up the proper
infrastructure for the RSA, securing promised funding, and
a lack of specialist doctors and nurses to run the clinics
[70]. However, these delays were to be expected with such
a new and innovative scheme and needed to be overcome
in the ensuing years [70].
Although RSAs play an important role in the collection
of real-world data, improved patient tracking and moni-
toring technology may be required for the efficient use of
risk sharing in a performance-based model. However, the
limitations of digital tracking systems are becoming less of
an issue in some countries, as well as for manufacturers, as
they are increasing their monitoring registries and imple-
menting new and improved tracking systems to keep pace
with modern healthcare needs [71].
RSAs are now used as a means to circumnavigate cost-
effectiveness barriers and IRP, when in fact HTA agencies
should be viewed as business partners instead of as barriers
or hurdles to overcome. Alternative pricing and reim-
bursement strategies such as RSAs may be the way forward
as traditional pricing and reimbursement methods are no
longer viable. All EU member states except for the UK and
Sweden apply a form of IRP because VBP is more com-
plicated [72]. However, IRP offers payers a means of
pricing a pharmaceutical that is not in line with optimal
welfare-maximizing pricing [72]. Both manufacturers and
payers are now engaged in RSAs as they are trying to find
payment models where the real price will differ from the
list price. [72]. An RSA or confidential discount to payers
can lower the cost of a product without changing the global
list price, meaning that a negative impact on a company’s
revenue could be avoided [68]. As an example, the PBRSA
for bortezomib in the UK allows the list price to be
unchanged, while the NHS can be refunded for non-re-
sponding patients [68]. This refund allows the net price per
unit of drug to be less than the price listed [68]. Ultimately,
it is predicted that IRP will cease to exist as the demand for
VBP is increasing where payers and HTA agencies are
requiring more evidence to make reimbursement decisions
[68, 72].
Our review found that RSAs are continuing to emerge as
many countries are engaged in new pricing and reim-
bursement strategies, although barriers to RSAs have been
extensively documented [71]. RSAs for high-priced spe-
cialty drugs have a place in the future as more personalized
medicines and better technology for identifying patient
responses are being developed. RSAs have evolved and
transformed immensely since their original conception and
implementation in the early 2000s. It is assumed they will
be primarily financial-based schemes in the coming years
in the EU, but a transition back to performance-based
schemes could occur in the near future. Technology for
patient tracking and monitoring is improving and may
match the needs of both the national healthcare payers and
the pharmaceutical industry. Conversely, RSAs may no
longer be viable as pharmaceutical companies become
better at creating and gathering data on the value of their
product. In doing so, they will build strong cases, lowering
the chances of rejection by HTA agencies. A clear under-
standing of factors influencing the adoption, implementa-
tion, and sustainability of and learning around RSAs are
necessary for further implementation strategies, while
ongoing evaluation of RSAs is essential and needs to be
reported in peer-reviewed articles.
Despite obtaining valuable data about the current use
and perception of RSAs, there were limitations to this
research. The systematic review may not have found all
relevant sources pertaining to RSAs because, before a
standardized definition and taxonomy were established,
RSAs had various names that are no longer used, and many
countries used their own terminology in their own lan-
guage. Non-English articles were excluded because of
language limitations among the people conducting the
research. In addition, article publication dates are not
always related to the exact year the content was written
about because of publication time requirements. This may
also be responsible for the lack of published articles in the
years 2000–2003. Another reason for the lack of informa-
tion lies in the fact that the overall process of pricing and
reimbursement is classified and not transparent in many
countries, and therefore it is difficult to obtain detailed
reports and procedures to not only replicate but also to
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learn from. The number of peer-reviewed articles being
published each year may not completely reflect the level of
interest in RSAs because this can be considered single
channel reporting and does not reflect all channels of lit-
erature. The level of interest in RSAs may vary between
manufacturers and payers as they are not directly repre-
sented by peer-reviewed articles. In spite of these limita-
tions, we feel that the depth and breadth of this study
(based on valuable data) makes a considerable contribution
to our knowledge of the field.
5 Conclusion
Information gathered in this systematic review indicates
that the current level of interest in RSAs in the EU is high
and has been increasing since 2000. Therefore, the number
of quantitative articles reporting the number of RSAs
implemented and case studies has been growing steadily as
evidence is becoming more readily available. The number
of qualitative articles reporting and discussing the under-
lying reasons for these changes in interest has generally
fluctuated over the last 15 years. Despite these fluctua-
tions, the overall level of interest in RSAs remains high
and continues to grow.
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Appendix
Search strategy for PubMed-NCBI
((((((((‘‘patient access scheme’’[All Fields] OR
((‘‘pharmacy’’[MeSH Terms] OR ‘‘pharmacy’’[All Fields]
OR ‘‘pharmaceutical’’[All Fields] OR ‘‘dosage for-
ms’’[MeSH Terms] OR (‘‘dosage’’[All Fields] AND ‘‘for-
ms’’[All Fields]) OR ‘‘dosage forms’’[All Fields]) AND
(‘‘risk’’[MeSH Terms] OR ‘‘risk’’[All Fields]) AND shar-
ing[All Fields])) OR ‘‘risk sharing scheme’’[All Fields])
OR ‘‘risk sharing agreement’’[All Fields]) OR ‘‘managed
entry agreement’’[All Fields]) OR ‘‘risk sharing’’[All
Fields]) OR ‘‘payment by result’’[All Fields]) OR ‘‘cover-
age with evidence development’’[All Fields]) OR (perfor-
mance[All Fields] AND based[All Fields] AND
(‘‘risk’’[MeSH Terms] OR ‘‘risk’’[All Fields]) AND shar-
ing[All Fields] AND agreement[All Fields])) OR ‘‘price
volume agreement’’[All Fields] AND ((hasabstract[text]
AND ‘‘loattrfull text’’[sb]) AND English[lang])
Filters: Abstract, Full text, English.
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